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dynamic process occurring over a long period of time and covering a wide 
range of events. The process of risk management concerns designifi~ 
strategies tp cope with risks, tactics for implementing these strategies 
and controlling risks when they occur, and restoring a firm's ability to 
implement these strategies after periods of distress have passed. The 
different types of risk responses discussed below can have one of three 
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effects: (a) risk responses can reduce the likelihood of risk occurrenc e 
by absorbing the risks within the business; (b) risk responses can reduc e 
the likelihood of risk occurrence by transfering the risk outside the 
business; and, (c) risk responses can better enable the firm to bear the 
risks when they do occur. 
Each sector of the farm business has a variety of ways to respond t c 
risk. These risk responses are generally collected into three groups: 
production, marketing, and finance. Befor e any tactic or strategy is 
undertaken, its risk reducing effect must be compared to the costs of 
potentially lower income from its adoption. 
Marketing responses to risk are used to minimize the risks of flue-
tuating prices. The types of market responses include: inventory man ag e 
ment, forward commitments, pooling arrangments, and information and 
learning. Inventory management can be used to reduce risk by changiag 
production and storage policies in order to affect the timing and magni -
tude of market transactions. One method of implementing inventory man ag 
ment is through spreading sales over time. As Boehlje and Trede state, 
''the primary advantag e of spreading sales is that a produc e r is not ti e d 
to a specific marketing date and retains flexibility in marketing." 
This seems contrary to the ideas of forward commitments which invol 
hedging, contract sales, and forward pricing of inputs. By hedging, a 
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producer shifts price risk to a speculator by use of the · futures market. 
Such action allows-a producer to establish a ''set" price for his commodi-
ty, and thus "lock ~ in" a profit margin. With such profits assured, the 
farmer knows that funds will be available to meet cash flow obligations. 
However, hedging subjects the farmer to basis risk (changes in the dif-
ference between cash and futures prices) and to additional financial risk 
from possible margin calls. 
loss position. 
The farmer must also avoid hedging into a 
Forward contracts can also guarantee a price but do not experience 
margin calls. A sal e s contract is less flexible than a hedge as it 
requires delivery of the commodity. The producer should assure that the 
commodity will meet contract specifications at sale time. Forward pricing 
could also fix input costs. While reducing price risk, forward con-
tracting may increase production risk through th e fixed delivery commit-
ment. 
Other marketing responses to risk include pooling arrangements where 
a farmer could transfer storage, sale, or pricing to a larg er organiza-
tion. The larger organization would presumably be in a more competitive 
position than the individual farmer. The larger organization could sell 
greater quantities of the good at on e time and perhaps command a higher 
price. Also the larger organization might have greater stor age capabili-
ties. Thus, the larger organization could pass the benefits of these 
pooling arrangements on to the farmer. 
The other mark e ting response is to increase information and learning. 
If a producer can increase his education or collect additional informa-
tion, he could formulate more realistic expectations about the futur e and 
better adjust his operations in response to this information. 
: 
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A General Overvi~w of Risk Theory and its Application to Agriculture 
1 Risk in Agriculture 
Before discussing the risks of agriculture it is useful to consider why 
risk and risk analysis ha11e commanded so much time and effort o f 
academicians. A successful farm business achieves an "optimal'' organiz a t i o n 
of activities in production, marketing, investment, financing, and consumption. 
A common thread among these activities is the influence of uncertainty. For 
the farm business, operating in a competitive environment, it is impossi-
ble to eliminate uncertainty. The nature of the production process makes 
the producer a speculator against weather, disease, market fluctuations, 
and even the actions of other producers. 
In 1972 Scott and Baker stated, "Much has b e en written about risk in 
farming, including major causes of risk such as plant and animal diseases, 
variations in the weather and other environmental changes, price fluctua-
tions, variations in human ability and judgement, etc .. " Robison and 
Brake state, "randomness of commodity output and prices are well-known 
phenomena that have plagued both farmers and their lenders as they develo~ 
plans and financial programs for the coming year." The Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation may have best characterized the situation when they 
wrote, "In farming, risk comes with the business. It always has and 
always will. Fortunately though, farmers today have more and better tool~ 
to help them manage risks, or, at least, to manage certain kinds of risk.' 
Before considering the concept of risk management, it is important tc 
identify the sources of risk in agriculture which Boehlje and Trede clas-
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sified into six categories: price risk, governmental policy and regula-
tions, busin~ss and legal risk, management discontinuity risk, riiks of· 
production, ~nd technological and obsolescence risk. Pric e risk a ris e s 
from fluctuating product and input prices, both affecting the profits of 
the farm business. Requiring farmers to comply with changes in g ov e rn ~-
mental policy leaves the farmer uncertain about acceptable chemical us ag e 
in production operations. Changing governmental export policy, and the 
subsequent effect on commodity prices, is another type of government ris k 
Business and legal risks are increasing in importance as farm e rs mak e mo r 
use of contractual arrangements and are more subject to potential law-
suits. Management discontinuity risk arises from the need to have con-
tinuous management for efficient operation. The death of a ma na g er c o u l ~ 
jeopardize the operation without provision for continuity of man ag ement. 
Weather, disease, and insects can affect production performance and con-
stitute the major components of production risk. Technological chang e s 
can make current production methods obsolete in a short time, and being 
too early or late adopting new technology could be costly to the agricul -
tural produc e r. 
2 Risk Management 
Risk or uncertainty (the terms are used interchan g e a bly) is n o t 
necessarily a d e triment. The presence of risk enables the produc e r t ~ 
obtain profits, and compels careful business judgement. Since it is 
impossible to eliminate risk, business judgement is needed to r e duc e t h~ 
uncertainty concerning the time, place, or e xt e nt of this risk. 
Good business judgement involves making decisions concerning ma ny 
a spects, not th e least of which is risk management. Risk ma n ag em en t i s 
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As with marketing responses, there are different categories of pro-
duction and financial responses to risk. In production these categories 
include: enterprise choice, enterprise diversification, flexibility, in-
formal insurance, and cost control. Enterprise choice may reduce produc-
tion risk by selecting those enterprises that exhibit low variability of 
income. Using one definition of risk (discussed in the following sec-
tion), low variability of outcome means low risk. Similarly, enterprise 
diversification can reduce production risk depending on the correlation 
conditions for different enterprises. Correlation of incomes indicat e s 
how the income of one enterprise changes when the income of another enter-
prise changes. If the correlation is positive, the incomes of the two 
enterprises move together; the higher the correlation, the more clos e ly 
the two move together. A low positive correlation or a negative correl a -
tion (resulting wh en incomes from the en terprise s move in opposite dir ec-
tions) would be desired. When the returns from on e enterprise are un-
favorable, the returns from the other m~y be favorable. By diversifying, 
a producer could invest part of his resources in a low profit enterprise 
because of its favorable correlation with other e nterprises. A diversi-
fied producer will sacrifice the prospects of very high expected earnings 
in return for a lower but more stable level of expected income. 
Flexibility in oper atio ns enables the producer to better adjust to 
changing conditions in agriculture. Flexibility could be product flexi-
bility - changing from one product to another (feeder cattle to feeder 
pigs or feeder cattle to slaughter cattle) - or cos t fl e xibility. Cost 
flexibility is achieved by maintaining a high proportion of total costs as 
variable costs. 
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Producers may use informal insurance to reduce risks. Selection of 
disease or insect-~esistant varieties of crops and livestock , health care 
activities, irrigation, and machinery sizing decisions are examples. Cost 
control results in lower costs and thus wider profit and safety margins. 
Financial responses to risk include: formal insurance, holding 
credit reserves, managing leverage, pacing of investment and disin-
vestment, hedging interest rates, and use of leasing programs. Formal 
insurance provides a source of liquidity that may be a viable alternative 
for some farmers. Insurance allows an individual an amount of prot ec tion 
for the cost of the premium. This concept enters the decision to use 
public programs. A farmer can use crop insurance to guarantee a minimum 
l eve l of yield for the price of the premium. These guarantees provided by 
public programs can affect more than the price and yield outcome expecta-
tions of farmers; they could influence lenders' c redit decisions a s well. 
Past studies have shown that the size, stuc t ure, cost, and other 
attributes of credit are sensitive to the actions of farm borrowers. 
Credit can provide a source of liquidity from lenders . Borrowing from 
credit reser ve s pr e vents liquidation of assets to me e t d e bt obligations 
and then reacquiring them after the stress period has passed. The a mount 
of credit r e s e r ve is the difference between a borrower's credit limit 
and the funds already borrowed. The credit limit is determined by th e 
lender based on evidence supplied by the borrower concerning his a bility 
to meet debt obligations. The lenders' credit decisions affect a firm's 
performance, a nd this e ff e ct increases as firms exp e ri e nc e greater r e li -
ance on leverage and liquidity. Lenders may respond to farmers' use of 
public programs by st a bilizing or lowering the costs of borrowing. If a 
lender must foreclose on a farm e r, there is a drain on the supply of 
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loanable funds. Therefore if a farmer maintains liquidity ~nd thus re-
duces the probability of bankruptcy, he may be ''rewarded" by the lend e r in 
the form of lower tiorrowing costs. Knowing the relationship between 
lenders' responses and the actions of farm borrowers may indicate possibl e 
modifications in financial programs and debt repayment plans used by 
farmers as responses to risk. 
Leverage management involves structuring liabilities so that curr e nt 
debt obligations do not exceed the farm business' capacity to me et thos e 
obligations. Adjusting the pace of business growth or disinvestm en t 
attempts to better match debt obligations with the pattern of debt s e r-
vicing capacity. A pace that is too slow or fast can cause c a sh flow 
problems. 
The hedging of interest rates would allow a farmer to stabiliz e the 
costs of borrowed capital. Leasing land on a sh a re-rent basis allows 
farmers to share their business risk with land ow n ers, and enables farm e rs 
to control an asset's use without having to pay the full acquisition 
price. Thus l e asing can alter a firm's liquidity position. 
3 Risk Definitions and Measurement of Risk 
The definitions of risk differ with no apparent consensus on th e 
"correct" definition. The risk definition chos e n is b a s e d on the c ondi -
tions of a particular study. Lowrance has defined risk a s the probability 
and severity of adverse effects. This definition r e lates the caus e s a nd 
effects of risk in determining who is exposed to what risks , in what wa y , 
and for how long. In this approach, analysts identify the adverse eff e cts 
of risk in order to determine the producer's risk bearing capacity. 
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Frank Knight was one of the first to examine the distinction between 
risk and uncertainty. He defined risk as a situation in which the future 
can be predicted wrth a specified degree of probability. Uncertainty was 
the situation where no probability could be assigned to future events. In 
recent literature no distinction is made between risk and uncertainty, due 
to the emergence of subjective concepts of probability. Other definitions 
of risk include: uncertainty in regard to cost, loss, or damage [Hardy]; 
the chance of loss [Webster's Dictionary]; the probability of disaster, 
and the dispersion of possible outcomes (Roumasset). 
Gabriel and Baker separate total risk into the components of business 
risk and financial risk. They define business risk as the variability of 
net operating income or net cash flows. Business risk is independ e nt of 
the firm's financial organization; it can be further classed into the 
production and marketing risks discussed above. Financial risk also has 
two components: the risk of cash insolvency and the risk accruing to 
equity holders from a firm's fixed financial obligations associated with 
debt financing and leasing. 
The discussion of measuring risk is as varied as the definitions of 
risk. If risk is defined as the dispersion of possible outcomes, the 
appropriate risk measure is one that describes this dispersion such as th e 
variance of the probability distribution. If risk is defined as the 
chance of loss or probability of disaster, the measure of risk is given by 
the probability of obtaining an outcome below a specified lev e l; this risk 
c onstraint can be stated in terms of outcome levels or probabiliti e s. 
Roumasset reports Joseph Stiglitz as defining risk similar to lov e ; a 
term familiar to all and defineable by none. This definition places risk 
as a general term and never tries to quantify it. Generally those 
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striving to find the appropriate measure of risk are seeking some number 
that will represent risk in the most valid way. Rothschild and Stiglitz 
attempted to define risk from the concept of risk aversion. Dillon sug-
gests that risk definitions should be avoided but believes risk aversion 
can be discussed without confusion (Roumasset). Stiglitz has provided 
evidence for avoiding classifications of risk attitudes (e.g. risk neu-
trality, risk aversion, relative risk aversion). However, as Arrow has 
pointed out, since the writings of Bernoulli it has been common to assume 
that individuals tend to display aversion to the taking of risks, an d th a t 
this concept of risk aversion is an explanation for many observed phenom-
ena in the economic world. 
4 Risk Theory 
To explain these economic observations, a th e ory has been sought to 
predict how individuals react in uncertain situations. This theory would 
contain a set of propositions about choice rules to indicate which action , 
from a set of available actions, would be followed. "Generally it is 
assumed that certain consistency relations hold among the choices from 
different sets of possible actions and that these sets belong to som e 
restricted class" (Arrow). 
Arrow states that the basic need for a theory of behavior under 
uncertainty arises from two considerations. The first involves the deci-
sion maker's subjective feelings of imperfect knowledge in choice deci-
sions. The second consideration is that som e observed phenomena, like 
insurance, cannot be explained on the assumption that individuals act with 
subjective certainty. A general approach that includes the decision 
maker's attitudes towards a dditional wealth is sought . . The need to in-
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elude this attitude has precluded using a criterion like maximizing ex-
pected money value -in favor of the more general expected utility theory. 
Dillon suggests th~t expected utility is the only approach that is norma-
tively coherent and logical as a basis for choice decisions under uncer-
tainty. 
The expected utility model gives a single-value index for ordering 
choices, while considering the preferences of the decision maker. It 
separates the decision maker's attitude toward additional wealth from his 
perception of the amount of uncertainty involved. Dillon points out that 
on the basis of three simple and reasonable postulates about 
rational choice, it (the expected utility model) implies: (a) 
the existence of a subjective probability distribution for the 
uncertain outcomes associated with any risky alternative; (b) a 
utility function that reflects the decision maker's prefer e nc es 
between alternative risky choices; and (c) that risky chance is 
optimized by choosing the alternative with the highest expected 
utility. 
The three postulates about rational choice form the basis of Bernoul-
li's principle. These axioms have been given a variety of names and some 
works contain elegant proofs of the theorem. The first axiom is that of 
ordering and transitivity. This axiom states that a decision maker either 
pref e rs one of two risky prospects or is indifferent between them. A 
pr e sumption of ordering is not trivial and becomes less so as we extend 
the concept to transitivity by adding more than two prospects. The con -
cept of transitivity states that if prospect A is preferred to prospect B 
and prospect B is preferred to prospect C, then prospect A is pref e rr e d to 
prospect C. 
The second axiom, called the continuity axiom, states that if th e 
decision maker prefers A to B to C, then there exists some probability 
P(A) other than zero or one such that the decision maker is indiff e rent 
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between prospect B and a lottery that yields prospect A with the prob-
ability P(A) and pcospect C with the probability 1 - P(A). This axiom 
implies that, face~ with a risky situation involving both a g ood and a bad 
outcome, the decision maker will take the risk if the probability of 
getting the bad outcome is low enough. 
The third axiom is the independence axiom. The concept of i n d e -
pendence is illustrated as follows: if prospect A is preferred to pros-
pect B and prospect C is any other risky prospect, then a lottery with 
outcomes of A a nd C will be pr e f e rred to a lottery with outcomes B a n d C 
provided the probability of obtaining outcome A is equal t o the probabili-
ty of outcome B. The prefer e nce of outcome A over outcome B is un a ff e cted 
by, or ind e p e nd e nt of, th e pr e s e nce of c. 
Based on thes e axioms, the expected utility theorem is stat e d as 
follows: for the decision ma ker whose preferenc es do not violate the 
axioms of choic e , th e r e ex ists a utility function, U, by which pr e f e r e nc e 
values can be assigned to possible outcomes and th e expected value of 
which is in t e rms of the d e cision mak e r's probability distributio n f o r 
out c om e s under ea ch choice alt e rnativ e . Some authors (Arr o w) r e fer to 
utility in terms of actions and states of the world. Actions are alterna-
tive ways of ge ttin g a job don e . Ea ch ac t h a s a u outcom e or range of 
outcomes which are aff e ct e d by stat e s of the world. The cons e quence (c .. ) 
lJ 
of an action (a.) is affected by the state of the world (P(0.)), whi c h in 
J l 
tur n aff e cts th e utility d e riv e d from that action. Thus the utility of a 
risky prospect is obtain e d by finding the expe cted valu e of the utility 
function in terms of the cons e quences of th e action tak e n. 
discrete outcomes th e n th e utility of action a. is 
J 
found by: 
If th e r e a r e 
~ 
U(a.) =. 
J J 
If the outcom e s ar e continuous, the utility formul a is: 
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0) f(0) d(0). The scale on which utility is defined 
is arbitrary. Whil~ some speak of cardinal utility measures, it is gen-
erally believed that utility measures can only provide an ordinal classi-
fi~ation of risky prospects. While tempting, it is meaningless to say one 
prospect yields twice as much utility as another or to compare utility 
values between individuals. 
A theory of choice based on these axioms has both merits and limita-
tions. According to Dreze, the merits and limitations of a theory can be 
examined from the viewpoints of relevance, usefulness, gen e rality, and 
integration with other theories. From the viewpoint of relevance, ex-
pected utility, (EU), has strong normative appeal. The axioms of EU 
theory are consider e d acceptabl e , but the strength of conclusions d e riv e d 
from them may limit the descriptive realism of the theory. The actions of 
some individuals may fail to satisfy the a xioms. Also the formaliz a tion 
of even a simple decision problem proves amazingl y intricate when all 
variables facing the decision maker are considered. It would be sur-
prising that any th e ory could correctly portray the decision situation 
for such complex problems. However, decision makers usually simplify the 
decision situation for an orderly, manageable approach that may not 
utilize all available information in the best possible way. Thus, mod e l-
ling ·approaches that appear abstract due to sparse detail may corr e spond 
more closely with actual d e cision situations than is actually believed. 
The viewpoint of usefulness considers the theory's capacity to r e -
solve logical difficulties in stating and solving pr o bl e ms. In this 
regard expected utility theory is considered more general and flexible 
than other alternatives. Expected utility theory also applies the mathe-
matical th e ory of probability to d e cision problems. Its usefulness has 
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been questioned on such points as the calibration of probabilities, relia-
bility in eliciti~g utility functions, and the disco ve ry of an optimal act 
from a given set iDreze). 
Dreze suggests that expected utility theory has almost complet e 
formal and logical geuerality. Formal generality i s earned by th e a b ilit y 
to encompass probl e ms that before were handled by pure mathematical 
theory; that is, problems where the relative frequencies in repeated 
situations could only be handl e d by the formalism of probability. 
generality involves expected utility as the decision cr i terion. 
single answer is given to various d e cision situations. 
Logic al 
Thus a 
A major virtue of ex pec ted utility theory is its integrated tr eatm en t 
of statistics, economic, and d e cision theory. In economics t h e conce pt of 
risk is described through events and cons e quences, valued in utilit y 
terms. The probabilistic mea sur e on events pro v i des the bridge with 
statistical theory. Th e th e ory applies to a si n g l e decision mak e r , but 
can ea sily be exte nded for group d e cision analysis. 
5 Risk Attitudes 
5.1 Risk Attitudes and Risk Aversion 
The pr efe rence of a d e cision maker for one risky prospect ov e r ano -
ther depends on his risk attitude. Gen e rally the a ttitud e toward risk is 
evidenced by the shape of the utility function, wh e r e wealth is th e obj e ct 
of utility. As depicted in Fi g ure 1, the decision maker's utility 
function will have one of thr ee ge n e ral forms: linear, concave or convex 
with respect to the origin. A linear function would imply a risk neutr a l 
attitude. A concav e function shows aversion to risk and a decision make r 
with a convex utility function would b e classified as risk pr e ferring. 
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Figure 1. Shapes of Utility Functions 
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However, the Friedman-Savage approach and work by Kahneman and Tversky 
suggest that an individual's utility function could have both concave and 
convex segments. 
The concept of risk aversion states that a risk averse individual is 
one who, starting from a position of certainty, is unwilling to tak e a 
fair bet. Alternatively, one can say that a risk averter will re qu ir e 
compensation for taking risks. In contrast, the risk neutral individual 
would make his decision without requiring compensation for risk bear i ng. 
The risk preferring decision maker would pay for the chance to take risks. 
Empirical evidence has shown most individuals display risk aversion, 
although the degree of risk aversion will vary among individuals . 
Arrow and Pratt individually related the concept of risk a ve rsion to 
the concept of utility in order to derive a measure of risk aversion that 
would be useful for interpersonal comparisons a nd other purpose s . Th ey 
specified utility as a fun c tion of we alth , as s ho wn in Figure 1. The 
first derivative of the utility function is the marginal utility of 
wealth; the second derivative quantifies the rate of chang e of marginal 
utility with respect to changes in wealth. Arrow and Pr a tt sought a 
measure of risk aversion based on the second derivative of the utility 
function, but modified so as to remain unchang ed under positive linear 
transformations of the utility function. A measure with these properties 
is the ratio of the second derivative of the utility function to the first 
derivative. Two such measures are: 
absolute risk aversion R (W) a -U"(W) I U'(W) 
relative risk aversion R (W) 
r 
-WU"(W) I U'(W) 
The absolute risk aversion measur e appr a is e s risk in absolute terms, 
wher e as the relative risk a version measure is in proportion to the we alth 
position. The measure of relative risk aversion is a measure of the 
elasticity of the-marginal utility of wealth. It changes not only with 
chan6es in the units of utility, but also with respect to changes in 
wealth. 
5 . 2 De t er mini 11 g R i s l<. At t i t u de s 
Where the theory of risk aversion is fairly straight-forward, the 
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determination of an individual's risk attitude is more complex. Obvious-
ly, the problem would be l e ss complex if the individual's utility function 
were known. Since this is generally not the case, an individual's utility 
function is estimated by fitting a specific function to utility values 
e licited from that individual. More will be said later on the functional 
forms of the utility function, but first the derivation of individual 
utility values is examined. 
According to Robison, Barry, Kliebenstein, a nd Patrick the approaches 
to measuring risk attitudes include: (a) direct elicitation of utility 
functions (DEU); (b) interval measures of risk aversion; (c) experimental 
methods; and, (d) observed economic behavior (OEB). 
The DEU method involves, as the name would imply, direct contact with 
the decision maker. Generally the direct elicitation method involves th e 
expected utility approach. Most elicitation procedures us e hypoth e tical 
3ambles - generally 50/50 gambles - where each outcome has the same proba-
bility of occurrence. Th e se outcomes may be expressed as monetary gains 
or losses. The various elicitation procedures yi e ld a s e ri e s of points i n 
utility-monetary outcome space that can then be fitted with a utility 
function. 
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Three well known varieties of the DEU method are the Von Neumann-
Morgenstern (VN) fuethod, the modified Von Neumann-Mor6eustern method, and 
the Ramsey method. The Von Neumann-Morgenstern method requires the deci-
sion raaker to identify the probability of occurrence for the _ favorable 
outcome that would leave him indifferent between the risky prospect and a 
certain prospect whose value is the average of the favorable and unfavor-
able outcomes. This method is also called the equally-likely-risky-
outcome method (ELRO). 
For this method the solicitor starts by defining a reference interval 
over two money outcomes. This interval is then broken into smaller inter-
vals on which the i11dividual will be tested about his utility pr e f e ren ce s. 
Next the solicitor establishes an arbitrary origin and scale of measure-
ment. Then the decision maker is presented with hypothetical lotteries, 
generally with equally likely (50/50) probabilities; the value of reward 
on one lottery is changed until the decision mak e r is indifferent betwe e n 
that lottery and one that has a specified utility value. A combination of 
such lotteries yields a series of money-utility pairings that is plotted, 
and a functional relationship established. 
The modified Von Neumann-Morgenstern method uses the 50/50 lotteries 
and elicits these utility values or preferences considering equally likely 
risky prospects, and then determines the certainty equivalent (ELCE). A 
certainty equivalent is the amount that a decision maker would exchang e 
for certain that l e aves him indifferent between the risky prospect and the 
certain prospect. As an example, consider a risk averse decision mak e r 
who is faced with the following prospect that has two equally likely 
outcomes. Outcome A is the possible payoff of $11,000 and outcome B has 
the possible payoff of $9,000. The expected monetary value of this 
situation is $10,000. 
point B in Figure· 2. 
The expected utility of this payoff is shown by 
The purchase price, or cost of the prospect, if 
equal to the expected mouetary value, is represented by point F which 
exceeds point B. Thus the investor will not undertake this prospect 
because the zero monetary gain translates into a utility loss for the 
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decision maker. The concave utility function ~ortrays decreasing marginal 
utility of wealth such that the $1,000 between $9,000 and $10,000 is mor e 
valuable to the decision maker than is the $1,000 between $10,000 and 
$11,000. Thus, for the risk averse decision maker, a fair bet, one wh e re 
the cost to play is equal to the expected monetary payoff, translates to a 
utility loss and the decision maker would not play. He would, however, be 
willing to play if the price he had to pay would yield the same utility as 
the expected utility of the investment. For the example above, the ex-
pected utility of the prospect is point D (see F igure 2) yielding a 
certainty equivalent of $9,700. 
For a risk averse decision maker the certainty price, or certainty 
equivalent, is always less that the expected monetary value of the pros-
pect. The difference is the risk premiura; in the above example the risk 
premium is $300 ($10,000 - $9,700 = $300). A series of such SO/SO "lot-
teries" would yield a series of certainty equivalent points that are 
plotted on a graph where utility and wealth are the axes. Thus the s e ri e s 
of lotteries and the certainty equivalents are used to estimate the deci-
sion ma ker's utility curve. 
The Ramsey method is similar to the modified Von Neumann-Morgenst e rn 
method. 
tives. 
It elicits certainty equivalents for a series of risky alterua-
This modification is intended to overcome decision maker's posibl e 
biases towards gambling or toward selected probability l ~ vels. 
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Figure 2. Certainty F.quivalents 
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The direct elicitation method of determining decision maker's utility 
has been criticiz~d because, as some (Young, Robison et al.) proclaim, it 
is subject to bias. This bias could arise from different interviewers 
administering the test, decision makers' preferences for special proba-
bility conditions or aversion to gambling, the non-inclusion of extraneous 
variables, time and experience limitations of participants as well as 
their beliefs on the realism of the game setting, the functional form of 
the fitted function, and compounding errors in the elicitation process. 
While these concerns about bias appear valid, the direct elicitation 
method should not be heavily discounted as few other approach~s can pro-
vide such a rich empirical base. Moreover, the elicitation procedure for 
the DEU method has been refined considerably. The cost of the elicitation 
procedure is still high, however, which limits its use in micro decision 
situations and research concerning farmers' ris k attitudes. 
In response to the problems of the direct elicitation approach, King 
and Robison propose the risk interval approach. For this approach deci-
sion makers are asked to order pair-wise comparisons of probability densi-
ty functions so that a confidence interval for a risk attitude measur e can 
be identified. They propose the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk av e rsion mea-
sure on which to identify the interval. The first step in this proc e dur e 
is to assume that a constant risk aversion measure, symbolized as A, is a 
good approximation of the true risk aversion function, at least over a 
small range. Next the risk aversion measure is calculated such that the 
calculated expected utilities for two different probability density 
functions are approximately equal. The decision maker then states a 
preferenc e for one of the two density functions. By stating his pr e f e r-
euce the decision maker has bisected the range of the constant risk av e r-
sion measure. A series of such questions would narrow the range of mea-
sure until it converges ou a single risk aversion value. This method 
affords the analy~t greater flexibility in measuring risk attitudes. It 
also allows greater generality in stating the relationship between risk 
aversion and monetary outcomes as perceived by the decision maker. This 
generality would allow for changes in a decision maker's risk attitude 
whereas a specified functional relationship would have an asso ciated 
pattern of risk attitude . 
Binswanger used a different approach to determine risk attitudes. 
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His approach, called experimentation, is based on gaming situations. This 
approach resembles the direct e licitation approach but r e duces som e of its 
bias. Actual financial compensation was included to add realism; the 
experiment was conducted over time to permit the respondents to r e flec t on 
their decisions, and r e spondents were t a ught about the gaming process 
prior to the analysis. 
Similar to the DEU method is an a pproach proposed by Patrick, Blake, 
and Whitak e r. Their approach to mea suring risk attitudes, labeled "magni -
tud e e stim a tion", is in the c lass of "ratio-scaling " techniqu e s. The 
decision maker is asked to judge the importance of one item relative t o a 
base item. In this case farmers could b e interviewed a bout the import a nc e 
of different goals . More will be s ai d about multiple goals lat er . 
The magnitude estimation procedure has several advantages. It is a 
well-docume nted proc e dure that h a s prov e d r e liabl e in a variety of con-
texts. It is easy to us e . Individua ls a r e a sk e d to assign values to 
certain items according to th e ir relative importance. Also, the judge-
me nts obtai ne d from farmers should be comparable across individuals and 
thus allow for aggregation of r e sults to ana lyze macro decisions. 
The observed economic behavior method draws inferences about risk 
attitudes from co~parisons between decision makers' actual behavior an~ 
their behavior as~predicted by empirical models. If, for example, two 
decision makers were stating preferences about risky alternatives, one 
having a lower return than the other, the decision maker choosing the 
lower risk alternative is considered more risk averse. 
Young summarizes the advantages of the observed economic behavior 
method. Like the direct elicitation approach, it can provide empirical 
measures of risk aversion. It can handle large amounts of data and is 
less costly than interview methods. It determines risk attitudes from 
actual situations aud not hypothetical gaming situations. One major 
drawback of this method, however, is that any difference between actual 
performance and predicted behavior is attributed entirely to risk aver-
sion. The actual behavior exhibited by a decision maker is probably 
influenced by other variables as well. 
6 Multidimensional Utilities 
Most decision makers realize that money and risk are not the only 
22 
variables worth considering. To capture the effects of these other vari-
ables some analysts deal with multidimensional utilities [Rausser and 
Yassour, Herath, Hardaker, Anderson]. Assessment of multidimensional 
utilities involves the benchmark , "quasi-separable" utility function, or 
the additive utility function approach (Anderson, Dillon, Hardaker). 
For the benchmark approach it is essential that for every multidimen-
sional consequence another consequence can be found that is indifferent to 
it and has constant values in all dimensions, but one whose preference is 
independent of the others. Using an example to illustrate this conc e pt, 
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consider a consequence consisting of possible outcomes x, y, and z. If 
a decision maker states a preference for outcome (x
1
, yi' z .) over outc-ome 
J 
z . ) ' 
J 
the~ for him values of x are preferentially independent of 
constant values in the other attributes. To further illustrate the 
benchmark approach consider a simple case using only two attributes x and 
y, x being preferentially independent of y. A benchmark level of y is 
selected, y*, and a value for x, x', is sought such that when paired with 
y*, the decision maker is indifferent between the hypothetical consequence 
(x', y*) and the particular consequence (x, y). This consequence pairing 
is then associated with a single utility value and a set of such associa-
tions would give a plot of points for which a functional relationship 
could be established. For a more detailed discussion of this appro a ch the 
reader is referred to Raiffa, 1968 or von Winterfeldt and Fischer, 1973 as 
referenced by Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker. 
Keeney recognized that the above approach co uld become tedious if 
there were several consequences with many attributes. He developed the 
"quasi-separable" utility function approach to aid in this problem. For 
this approach we need to develop the concepts of joi nt preferentially 
independence and utility independence. For a decision maker, attributes 
are jointly preferentially independent if the location and shape of the 
indifference curve for a combination of two are independent of the level 
of other attributes. An attribute is utility-independent if the decision 
maker's preference for consequences involving that attribute do not depend 
on the level of other attributes. 
If we have a case of n attributes and can assume that the require-
ments of joint preference and utility independence hold, then the utility 
function can be written as a function such that U(x
1
, x
2
, x ) = 
n 
U (x )) where the utility for a particular at-
n n 
tribute is scaled-from zero to one. If the utility is scaled, the 
function will eit9er be additive or multiplicative form as shown. 
Additive: 
Multiplicative: 
n 
r k
1 
U.(x.) 
i=l 1. 1. 
n 
II 
i=l 
[Kk. U.(x.) + l] - l} /K 
1. 1. 1. 
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where k. is the scaling factor for the utility to be between zero a nd one 
j 
and K is another scaling constant. 
In this manner one now only need assess n one-dimensional utility 
functions and the n scaling factors of k. instead of an n-dimensional 
1. 
utility function directly. The value of k is based on the probability, 
pi, such that the decision maker is indifferent between (a) the conse-
quence where one attribute is at its most preferred stage and all other 
attributes are at their least preferred stage and (b) a lottery of proba-
bility p. that yields the consequence where all attributes are most pre-
1. 
ferr e d and the chance of 1 - pi that all consequences will be at their 
least preferred state. Thus 
+ -
in a two attribute case, U(x 1 , x 2 ) = Pi 
- + + 
, x
2
) and hence U(x
1 
, x
2
) =pi. Again, a 
more detailed description of this approach is found in Keeney. 
The additive utility function approach is the simplest and most 
widely used to evaluate multidimensional utilities. Only determination of 
the on e dimensional utility function for each attribute and scaling factor 
is involved. Each attribute is scaled as in the quasi-separable approach 
with the most preferred set of attributes given a scale factor of one. 
The other attribute consequences are scaled between zero and one against 
·-
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the most preferred set. Even though the assumptions of the additive 
utility function may rarely be met, the approach will yield results sim-i-
lar to, but withoyt the complications of, a non-additive function. 
A lexicographic utility ordering exists if the decision maker does 
not allow tradeoffs between attributes. The goals are sequentialy or-
der e d, but overachievement has no effect on total utility whereas under-
achievement yields infinite disutility. In terms of the axioms of ex-
pected utility theory, this ordering implies the continuity axiom no 
longer holds. Utility is no longer expressed as a single real number, but 
as a priority vector reflecting the expected utility at each attribute 
dimension. 
Since underachievement of a goal results in disutility, the most 
preferred attribute must be achieved before considering the next most 
preferred, and so on. Most writings concerning l exicographic utility 
preferences use the term "saf e ty-first" rule. He re, the decision maker 
satisfies the safety preference first and then s e eks to meet other goals. 
Pyle and Turnovsky discuss three safety-first rul e s. The first, put forth 
by Tesler, assumes that the decision maker maximizes his e xpected retur n s 
after assuring that the chance of receiving a return less than the speci-
fied safety level (E-min) is not greater than a specified probability (P). 
This risk can be expressed as Maximize E subject to Probability (E ~ Emin) 
< p. The values of E-min and P indicate the degree and direction of the 
risk attitude of the decision maker. 
Kataoka introduced a s e cond safety-first rul e . Under this rul e 
the decision maker chooses the plan that maximizes r e turns at a lower 
confidence limit (L) subject to a constraint that the chance of recievi n g 
less than the lower lim i t is not g re a t e r than the specific value of P. 
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The second rule could be written: maximize L subject to Probability (E < 
L) <P. This rule-maximizes the return along a lower confidence limit P. 
The third safety-first rule chooses a plan that has the smallest 
probability of yielding a return below the specified minimum. Roy de-
veloped this plan that could be written: minimize Probability (E < E-
min). 
7 Functional Forms ~ Utility Functions 
A functional relationship for the plotted preference points is need e d 
to derive the single attribute utility function which becomes the basis 
for future analysis. (Single attribute utility functions are the most 
commonly used). Several forms are possible: linear, polynomial, log-
arithmic, powe r, and exponential. The linear function characterizes a 
risk neutral decision maker as shown in Figure 1. However, empirical 
evidence shows most decision ma kers are risk av e rse; thus the linear 
function is not appropriate. 
A polynomial utility function can be justified as it is a Taylor 
series approximation of the unknown true utility function. This e quation 
2 3 could be written as U(w) = w + bw +cw + ... The number of terms to 
include is based on a priori judgements and on the best statistical fit of 
the elicited points in an empirical analysis. This will usually be don e 
by matching the number of terms in the equation to the number that the 
decision maker considers when stating his preferences. Empirically, good 
fits have been obtained by using two (quadratic) or three (cubic) t e rms 
(mom e nts of the probability distribution). 
The quadratic utility function could be specified as U(w) = w + bw 2 
where the restriction dU/dW > 0 necessitates W < -1/2 b , if b < 0, to 
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display decreasing marginal utility of wealth. If X were a risky prospect 
under considerati5n, its utility could be found by U(W) = E(W) + b[E(wn 2 
+ b[M
2
(W)] where ~ 2 (W) is the variance of w. Since M2 (W) must be positive 
and U/ M
2
(W) = b, then the requirement for a risk averse decision maker, 
b < 0, implies that variability hinders utility. The utility of the 
expected value of this prospect can be shown by U[E(W)] = E(W) + b[E(W)J 2 . 
Comparing this function with the utility function stated earlier, it can 
be shown that U(W) - U[E(W)] Since M
2
(W) is positive, the 
utility of a risky prospect is smaller than the utility of the expected 
value of a certain prospect for the risk averse decision maker, as shown 
earlier in Fi6ure 2. 
A similar statement applies to the cubic function, U(W) = w + bw 2 + 
3 cw . The condition, Jc - b 2 > 0, must hold if the first derivative of the 
utility function with respect to wealth is to b e everywhere positive. The 
cubic function shows an initial stage of decreasing marginal utility, 
followed by a stage of increasing marginal utility. This could occur for 
a particular decision maker, but generally there is a restricted range in 
which the cubic function will be relevant. 
While useful in empirical aplication, polynomial utility functions 
have been faulted on theoretical grounds. One criticism is that poly-
nomial functions are not everywhere monotonically increasing. This may 
not be a problem for estimated functions used over a specific range of 
values. 
Another criticism of polynomial functions is that an n dimensional 
function implies that only n moments of the probability distribution 
affect the decision. Depending on the importance of higher moments of the 
probability distribution, this could lead to a wrong assessment of the 
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true function. If the derivative of the utility function with respect to 
the moment in queition indicates that moment's importance, then the sm~l-
ler is the derivative, the less its importance. 
Perhaps the most critical shortcoming of polynomial functions is 
their failure to exhibit decreasing risk aversion with increases in 
wealth. Again this may pose no problem if the polynomial function rep-
resents a local approximation of a decreasing risk-averse function for 
wealth. A new function could be fit for the decision maker if the change 
in wealth was significant. 
To overcome the faults of polynomial functions, other functional 
forms have been used. These functions may be more theoretically ap-
pealing, but are harder to work with. In general, the function chosen 
should give the best representation of the true utility function. 
A logarithmic utility function would be sp e cified as U = log w. A 
e 
c 
power function is expressed as U = W . An expon e ntial function is rep-
resented as U = 1 -cw - e If the analyst is working with normal proba-
bility distributions, the exponential function is equivalent to EU(V) = 
2 E(V) - ba . 
v 
This expression, in expected utility terms, contains the 
expected value, variance, and a risk aversion measure. 
Assuming that an individual bases his decision on two parameters, 
mean and variance, a quadratic utility function could be inf e rred and 
portfolio theory can be used as our analysis tool. The decision maker's 
preferences could be expressed by a field of indifference curves as in 
Figure 3. In the figure indifference is expressed between MR (mean of 
returns from an activity) and a (standard deviation of those returns) on 
r 
the respective axes. A decision maker is indifferent between all points 
. ., 
EXPECTED 
RET UR N 
Figure 3. Indifference Curves 
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that lie on a curve such as r
1 
and indifference curves that lie above and 
to the right of another are preferred (I preferred to I ). 
2 1 
Portfolio tpeory is used to explain a decision ma ker's choice of th e ~ 
"best " portfolio, where a portfolio is defined as any combination of 
assets. "Best" means that for a specified rate of return the portfolio 
has the lowest risk, or for a specified risk level the portfolio has the 
highest return. The expected return for a portfolio is a weighted averag e 
return over all assets in the portfolio; the returns for each asset are 
weighted by its proportion in the portfolio. Portfolio risk is measured 
by the variance or standard deviation of returns (Figure 3 then graphs 
the indifference curves in risk-return space). A fundamental concept of 
portfolio theory is the belief that the riskiness of an individua l a sset 
differs depending on whether the asset is held in isolation or as part of 
a portfolio. Portfolio analysis will be discus s e d in more detail when 
other models for decision making under conditions of risk are examined. 
8 Risk Models 
8.1 General Risk Models 
Different models have been developed to study decision making under 
conditions of uncertainty and the effects of risk respons e s on the farm 
business. These models fall into three main categories: (a) ma ximizing 
methods; (b) efficiency an a lysis methods; a nd, (c) satisficing me thods 
(Anderson). Each group has several subclassifications. The categories 
and subclassifications a re discussed as follows. 
Maximizing methods ar e the most commonly us e d by analysts, p e rh a ps 
because they provide orderly solutions and single answers. These me thods 
are often bas e d on portfolio concepts involving th e me a n a nd varianc e of 
returns. Portfolio analysis will be examined in detail, but first other 
methods are briefly discussed. 
As Table 1 sbows, the first type of maximizing model is the ex-
pected utility model. In essence, this method elicits preferences for 
hypothetical prospects which are then encoded into a function which is 
used as a choice indicator. Difficulties with this method i n volve th e 
need to empirically e stimate utility functions and subjective probabili-
ties. 
The next method in this category is moment expected utility. Since 
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probability distributions can be described by moments of those distribu-
tions, the expected utility function could represent a weighted sum of the 
series of moments (each moment weighted by its importance to the d e cision 
choice where the total weight is one). Here the difficulty is in es-
timating the number of relevant moments. The e x pected profit method, 
third in this category, considers only one mome n t of the distribution. 
Such a model is applicable only for risk-neutral decision makers. 
The second category of maximizing me thods is labeled "security". 
Security methods focus on the lower ends of probability distributions and 
a critical level of outcomes to be met. Although not based on utility 
functions, Markowitz and Masson state that it is possible to relate these 
two categories. 
First in the s e curity category is the safety principl e . The conc e pt 
here is to minimize the probability that the profit goal will not fall 
below a specified critical level. This method usually bases the d e cision 
rule on the mean and standard deviation of the prob a bility distribution. 
Next in this category is the saf e ty-first rule which is operationally 
equivalent to chance constr a ined programming. He r e th e principl e is to 
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Table 1. Summary of Methods for Modeling Single Attribute Ri'sky 
Decisions (reproduced fran Anderson, page 45) 
Category Expository Reference 
A. Maximing methods 
1 • Utility function 
a. Expected utility 
b. Moment expected utility 
Berch, 1968 
Hadar, 1971 
Hart, 1951 c. Expected profit 
2. Security 
a. Safety principle 
b. Safety first 
c. Safety fixed 
d. Maximin · 
3. Lexicography 
a. LSF 
4. Elimination by aspects 
B. Efficiency analysis methods 
1. Stochastic dominance 
a. FSD 
b. SSD 
c. TSD 
d. DSD 
e. n-th order SD 
f. convex SD 
2. Utility-family-specific 
a. Polynomial 
b. Exponential 
3. Others 
a. E-V 
b. E-A 
c. E-SV 
d. E-H 
e. Partial FSD 
f. E-Safety 
C. Satisfi cing methods 
a. Arbitrary and un-
classifiable 
Roy, 1952 
Charnes and Cooper, 1959; 
Shackle, 1952; Tesler, 
1955 
Kataoka, 1963 
Wald, 1950 
Encarnacion, 1964 
Tversky, 1972 
Quirk and Saposnik, 
Hadar and Russell, 
Whitmore, 1970 
Vickson, 1975 
Hammond, 1974 
Fishburn, 197 4b 
orderings 
1962 
1969 
Hanoch and Levy, 1970 
Hammond, 1974 
1-'.arkow itz, 195 9 
Markowitz, 1959 
Markowitz, 1959 
Philippatos and Gressios, 
Anderson, 1974 
Baumol, 1963 
Simon, 1957 
Exemplary Agricultural 
Application Reference 
Dillon, 197 1 
McArthur and Dillon, 1971 
Heady and Dillon, 1961 
Boussard, . 1969 
Boussard and Petit, 1967; 
Kenne dy and Franci sec, 
1974 
Rownasset, 1974 
Dillon, ·1962 
Roumasset, 1976 
Gladwin, 1975 
0' Mara, 1971 
Anderson, 1974 
Hardaker and Tanago, 
Dry nan, 1977 
1973 
Anderson, et al.' 1977 
1975 
Dry nan, 1977 
Freund, 1956 
Hazell, 1971 
Hazell, 1971 
Anderson, 1974 
Webst er and Kennedy, 
1975 
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maximize an objective function which is constrained by a specified crit-
ical probability.- The specified probability constrains the "disaster" - in 
that the probabilJty of meeting the minimum acceptabl e l e v e l of the ob-
jective function is greater than or equal to the specified probability. 
Mathematically this concept is presented as: Maximize profit (TI) subj e ct 
to the probability (P) of profit being below the critical level ( TI ) is 
less than or equal to the specified probability (P*) 
TI ) < P* 
c 
Max TI s.t. p (TI < 
The safety-fixed rul e is used when the decision mak e r is seeking to 
maximize his minimum return with a probability at least equal to a minimum 
specified probability. Mathematically the method could be specified as 
(using the notation abov e ): Max TI s. t. 
c 
P(TI <TI ) 
- c 
< P*. As can b e se e n, 
this rule is an alternative version of the safety-first rule. The maximum 
method is just a special cas e where P* is zero. 
Third in the class of ma x imiz ing mod e ls is le xicographic ordering. 
This me thod is usually a ppli e d to multiple goal planni n g, and may includ e 
the safety-first rul e s. These conc e pts we re discuss e d e a rlier in this 
ch a pter. The "e limination by aspects'' me thod i s simil a r to l e xicogr a phic 
ordering. Whil e probably b e tter classified as a s a tisficing method, it is 
associated with th e maximizing methods b e cause of the possible application 
t o single attribute d e cisions a nd for ea s e of cross r e f e r e nce. In this 
method prospects a re compared, on e a spect at a tim e , a nd those not mee ti ng 
pred e termined st a nd a rds a r e e limi na t e d. 
Differing from th e max imizin g me thods a r e th e " e ff i ci e ncy ana lys i s" 
methods. Maximizing me thods r e sult in a complete ord e ring of risky pros-
p e cts while e fficiency methods a chi e ve a p a rtial ord e ring. The first 
subclass of efficienc y a n a lysis me thods is stochast i c d o mi na nc e . 
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Different degrees of dominance have been established, where in-
creasing the number of degrees weakens the dominance condition. In gen~ 
eral, the dominan~e rules are based on comparisons between cumulative 
distribution functions (CDF) for risky prospects. First degree dominanc e 
(FSD), the weakest rule having the least ordering power, occurs when one 
risky prospect is preferred over another by all expected utility max-
imizers. If this condition was shown graphically, the dominant CDF would 
lie to the right of the other CDF, and nowhere to the left. If the 
distributions were normal, this could only happen if the variables were 
the same but the means differed. 
Second degree stochastic dominance (SSD) applies when the area encom-
passed by one CDF remains smaller than another, as the area is summed 
sequentially over larger values of stochastic outcomes. Again looking to 
two prospects, if A dominates B by SSD, then A would be preferred over B 
by all risk averse utility maximizers. 
Third degree stochastic dominance is applied to utility maximizers 
with concave utility functions that have a positive third derivative. 
Third degree stochastic dominance (TSD) discriminat e s among prospects 
based on the skewness of the distribution. DSD, decreasing stochastic 
dominance, is weaker than third degree stochastic dominance; it applies to 
all risk averse decision makers with decreasing absolute risk aversion. 
Stochastic dominance with respect to a function was used by King and 
Robison in connection with their interval method explained previously. 
Convex stochastic dominanc e and n-th order stochastic dominance have b een 
explored by some authors. The analytical burden and questionable gains 
from using these more complex methods make them inappropriate for us e in 
many studies. 
.· 
The next set of methods is "utility family specific orderings". 
These methods buiLd on the algebraic forms of the utility function. An~ 
derson reports th~ two most prominent types of utility functions used in 
research are the polynomial utility function [Anderson et al. 1977] and 
the negative exponential utility function [Dryan 1977] (Anderson). The 
generalities of these functions were examined earlier. 
The EV method, mean variance rule, is a special case combining both 
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efficiency and maximizing methods. EV methods have had long and extensive 
use in portfolio analysis and quadratic programming. 
this method warrants further discussion below. 
The popularity of 
Mean-absolute deviation analysis (EA) is a linear alternative to EV 
analysis. EA analysis defines risk as the mean absolute income d e viation 
instead of the variance of income for EV analysis. Some argue that this 
definition is less satisfactory than variance, but EA analysis is readily 
adaptable to linear programming and thus has a pragmatic appeal. 
Another alternative to EV analysis is ESV an a lysis. ESV, mean-
semivariance analysis, is used when the researcher believes that semi-
variance is a more satisfactory measure of risk than variance. Here only 
the deviations below the mean, or below some disaster level, are con-
side red. EH, mean-entropy, analysis is another alternative that uses 
entropy, or disorder, as a distribution-free measure of risk. The results 
from EH analysis are similar to EV analysis; therefore EH anlaysis is not 
used often in decision analysis. 
Anderson lists models that modify the FSD rule. These modifications 
are based on the belief that the analysis of overlapping CDF's are unim-
portant and can be ignored. Intersections in the lower tail of the CDF's 
occur so infrequently that they can be ignored. Those intersections that 
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occur above the mean or in the upper tails are also regarded as unim-
portant to the deEision maker and can be ignored. Anderson states thaC 
there are no theo~etical foundations for these beliefs; nonetheless they 
still have practical appeal. E-Safety methods involve the safety-first 
attitudes of decision makers, as discussed above. 
The satisficing methods complete the classification of models. Thes e 
methods use satisficing rules, as opposed to maximizing rules involving 
predetermined levels of attributes. These methods are vague and uncon-
structed; any such rules could be formulated to explain decision makers' 
behavior. While they may show significant explanatory power, their lack 
of theoretical basis limits their usefulness for formal study. 
8.2 Portfolio Analysis 
Because of its popularity with researchers, portfolio analysis war-
rants a more detailed discussion. Portfolios will differ regarding the 
assets that comprise the portfolio and the amount of investment in each 
asset. The expected return of a portfolio is the weighted average of th e 
returns from individual assets; the asset's return weighted by the propor-
tion of investment commited to that asset. 
n 
Numerically this is shown as 
R 
p 
L r x 
i=l i 
where R = return on the portfolio, 
i p 
r return on individual 
i 
asset i, x. = proportion of investment in asset i and n = number of 
l 
assets. 
Th~ ''risk'' of the portfolio is measured by the standard deviation of 
returns. The numerical calculation of risk is 
u 
2 2 
n n 
crp L x. a. + 2 L L x. x. c. a. a . 
i=l l l i=l j=l l J lj l J 
i~j 
where a 
p 
standard deviation of portfolio return, xi(j) = proportion of 
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investment in asset i(j), 
(J i ( j ) 
= standard deviation of returns of asse t 
and c = c9rr e lation of returns for a ssets i a nd j . 
ij 
i ( j ) ' Portfolio risk 
is a function of the proportions of investment, the variances of asset 
returns (first term under the radical), and the covariances of ass e t 
returns (second term under the radical). 
The expected return and the standard deviation of a s e t of portfolios 
are plotted on a graph as shown in Figure 4. 
Based on the r e lationships in the figure, portfolio B is superior to 
portfolios A and C for a risk averse decision maker. Portfolios B and A 
experience the same risk, but B has the higher return. Similarly port-
folios B and C have the s a me e xpe cted returns, but portfolio C h a s th e 
higher risk. The set of "efficient" portfolios are those that maximize 
return for a given risk l e v e l or minimize risk fo r a given level of 
return. Connecting the poi n ts repres e nting th es e effici e nt portfolios 
yields an efficient frontier. This effici e nt frontier (EV set), shown in 
Figur e 5, is positiv e ly slop e d, indic a tin g incr ea sin g returns ar e 
achi e v e d only with a dded risk. 
Some writin g s includ e a risk-fre e ass e t to show the possibl e gains in 
risk efficiency, and the implications for the financi a l structur e of the 
portfolio. In Fig ur e 6 a risk-free a sset is shown a s RF, yi e lding 
return RF and zero risk. Point M represents a portfolio on the effici e nt 
frontier. Combi n i n g the risk-free ass e t with thos e assets in portfolio M 
yields a n e xtend e d effici e nt s e t MRF. Points to th e right of M on lin e MR 
represent portfolios th a t can be obtained if the investor borrows mon e y at 
the risk-free rat e RF and inv e sts in portfolio M. If no borrowing is 
allowed, the efficient fronti e r is the line RFME . 
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Figure 6. Efficiency Frontier Including a Risk-Free Asset 
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Suppose borrowing and lending were both allowed, but at differing 
rates. Figure 7 shows lending at rate RF and borrowing at rate RF' 
both risk free. ~ending activities involve positive holdings of the risk-
free asset and borrowing represents negative holdings of the risk-free 
asset, both in connection with the holdings of portfolios Mand N, re-
spectively, on the efficient frontier. In this case the efficient fron-
tier becomes R MNR 
F F 
Once the efficient frontier is determined, the analysis expands to 
account for the decision maker's indifference curves. These curves 
(Figure 3) depict the decision maker's preferences. All points along an 
indifference curve are equal in preference and a more preferred point lies 
above and to the right of another (I preferred to I ). 
2 1 
The indifference curves of Figure 3 are combined with the efficient 
frontier to indicate the optimal portfolio. Th e optimal portfolio is 
represented by the tangency point between an ind i fference curve and the 
efficient frontier, as shown by point M in Figur e 3. Including a risk-
free asset enables the investor to r eac h a higher indifference curve 
through lending or borrowing. This is shown in Figur e 9. 
9 Shifting the EV Frontier 
Robison and Barry examined how an optimal portfolio will change as 
decision makers alter their level of risk aversion or are subject to 
circumstances which may cause a shift in the efficient frontier. Shifts 
in the efficient set are caus e d by changes in the return of a risk-free 
asset, changes in the means or variances of returns on risky assets, and 
changes in beginning wealth position. Shifts in the EV set can be paral-
EXPECTED 
RETURN 
E 
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Figure 7. Efficiency Frontier for Different Risk-Free 
Borrowing and Lending Rates 
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lel or nonparallel, and nonparallel shifts can be either positive or 
negative. 
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Robison and 'Barry state, "Parallel shifts of the EV set are caused by 
changes in the decision maker's initial wealth." By adding wealth, the 
expected returns for each asset in the EV set are increased by equal 
amounts while the variances remain unchanged. For a parallel shift, the 
slope of the new EV set is the same as the slope of the old set at the 
same level of variance. 
Robison and Barry describe positive and negative nonparallel shifts 
as, "A negative (positive), nonparallel shift in the EV set occurs if 
lines drawn tangent to the EV sets at points of equal variance form a 
smaller (larger) angle of inclination with the abscessa, the axis mea-
suring expected wealth." (In their work they sketch the EV set on a graph 
where variance, used as the risk indicator, is me asured on the vertical 
axis and wealth is measured on the horizontal axis.) Changes in the 
distribution of returns on risky assets, either expected return or vari-
ance of returns, will cause these nonparallel shifts. A nonparallel shift 
could result from a change in the return on the risk-free asset. Th ese 
shifts will differ in that the change affecting the risk-free asset will 
change the point at which the EV set int e rsects the wealth axis wh e reas a 
change in the distribution of risky assets will leave this point of int er-
section unchanged. If th e expected return of a risky asset were increased 
with no change in the variance, then any portfolio containing this asset 
would experience increasing returns, the same variance, and the EV s e t 
would shift to the right. A similar shift would occur if the expected 
return was held constant but the variance was reduced. 
Changes in the portfolio holdings and therefore changes in the EV 
frontier can be divided conceptually into two components: income effect 
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and substitution effect. The parallel shift of the EV frontier described 
earlier is considered the income effect of a change in demand for a gi~en 
portfolio. In this analysis, prices of assets are considered random 
variables with their distribution remaining constant as risk-free wealth 
increases. Therefore the income effect results from increasing the risk-
free wealth position of the decision maker. Cass and Stiglitz have stated 
a theorem relating the income effect and absolute risk aversion measures: 
if there are two assets, one risky and one safe, total purchases of the 
risky asset increase, remain constant, or decrease with increases in 
initial as absolute risk aversion decreases, remains constant, or in-
creases. Robison and Barry define the substitution effect as "the change 
in quantity demanded resulting from a change in the probability distribu-
tion of prices after compensating the decision ma ker for a change in risk-
free income. They summarize this concept as follows: "Any change in the 
quantity of risky assets that occurs while holding the equilibrium slope 
of the EV frontier constant is due entirely to the substitution effect. 
Any change in the quantity of risky assets that occurs when the slope 
changes is due entirely to the income effect." 
Robison and Barry also presented this discussion graphically. In 
Figure 10 the original EV frontier is shown as curve 1. Let the initial 
equilibrium be at point A. The frontier then undergoes a negative, non-
parallel shift to the right; the new equilibrium is point D. To determine 
how much of the change is caused by the substitution effect, the new 
frontier, curve 2, is shifted to the left until tangent with line BC, 
which approximates the decision maker's indifference curve. Curve J shows 
• 
• 
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the position of curve 2 after the shift; the tangency point is at E. The 
substitution effect is determined by / the difference in quantity of assets 
in the portfolios·· A and E. The income effect shows the change in assets 
as the portfolio moves from E to D. 
Shifts in the EV frontier and changes in equilibrium slopes hav e the 
following effects on the return and variance of the portfolio held. Par-
allel shifts on the frontier will cause the equilibrium variance to in-
crease, remain constant, or decrease if the decision maker exhibits de-
creasing, constant, or increasing absolute risk aversion. If the shift 
of the frontier is a negative nonparallel shift to the right, then the 
portfolio wealth and variance increase for constant or decreasing absolute 
risk aversion. Positive nonparallel shifts to the right result in de-
creasing portfolio variance if there is constant or increasing absolute 
risk aversion. Similar statements can be made i f the shift is to th e 
l e ft. It is possible to determine the effects o f shifts in the EV fron-
tier on the holdings of individual assets. This determination requires 
more rigorous mathematical derivation and therefore is not included h e re. 
If such is of interest, the reader is referred to Robison. 
This paper has not attempted to provide a comprehensive review of 
all studies of risk and risk management in agricultur e . Rather, the 
object was to present the basic ideas and theoretical foundations on which 
most risk studies have been constructed. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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